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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE
STATE OF UTAH

STATE OF UTAH 1

Plaintiff-Respondent,

-v-

Case No. 17 518

WILLIAM HARRISON CLAYTON,

Defendant-Appellant.

STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
Appellant was charged with one count of murder in
the second degree, in violation of Utah Code Annotated, S
76-5-203(1) (b)

(1977), for committing an act clearly dangerous

to human life, while intending to cause serious bodily injury
to another, which led to the death of John Linde of Provo.
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
Appellant was tried before a jury and was found
guilty of one count of second degree murder on November 25,
1980 in the Fourth Judicial District Court, the Honorable
Aflen B. Sorensen, presiding.

Appellant was sentenced on

November 25, 1980 to confinement in the Utah State Prison for
an indeterminate term of not less than five years to life on

the one count.
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Respondent seeks an order of this Court affirming
the judgment and sentence of the court below.
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
John Linde was the victim of a brutal beating which
eventually led to his death (T. 18).

He ·was an elderly

gentleman who had been seen in good health at 4:00 p.m. on
November 14, 1979.

However, he was discovered semiconscious

later that same evening in his home around midnight by a
neighbor, Richard Findley (T. 20, 31).

Mr. Linde was lying on

his bedroom floor moaning and groaning; his teeth had been
knocked out, his clothes torn, his face beaten, and he was
coughing up blood (T. 21).
discovered (T. 87).

Blood was also found in several of the

other rooms (T. 21, 53).
113).

Multiple rib fractures were later

'!he home had been ransacked (T,

Every drawer, cannister, and book had been strewn about

and all rooms were in shambles (T. 20, 26, 53, 54).

Part of

the inside unit of the telephone had been removed and
disconnected (T. 25, 51).

A butcher knife was found in a

bedroom and another located in the living room ( T. 51).

Both

had blood spatters on them (T. 113).
Mr. Linde died on December 10, 1979 without ever
recovering sufficiently to communicate with others (T. 41).
His personal physician who attended him while he was
-2Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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hospitalized gave his opinion that he would not "have died had
he not received the beating • • • • (T. 42).

This opinion was

corroborated by the medical examiner who performed the autopsy
(T. 87, 88).

Among items that Mr. Findley noticed in Mr. Linde's
home the night of the beating was a yellow baseball-style cap
(T.

22, 112) (State's Exhibit No. 1).

He had seen it earlier

that evening at about 8 :00 p.m. at Bullock's Billiards worn by
a "bearded man with long hair • • • an orange vest [and]
Levis" ( T. 22).
(T.

23).

He remembered the hat had a bend in the bill

Although he positively identified the hat, he was

not certain whether appellant had been the bearded man he had
seen wearing the hat at the billiard hall (T. 23).

Defendant

was clean-shaven at trial.
David Robertson, an acquaintance of appellant,
wrked at Bullock's Billiards and had twice seen appellant on
t~

evening of November 14, 1979--once at the billiard hall at

about 7:30 p.m. (T. 102).

He said appellant was wearing an

orange hunting vest or jacket, Levis, and a yellow baseball
cap (T. 103).

He identified the baseball cap found in-the

victim's home as the same one worn by appellant at the
billiard hall, noting it had an identical patch with an AHI
helicoptor on it, and that it had the bill folded to square it
up (T. 103-105).
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Human hairs found on the cap were scientifically
compared with samples of head hair taken from the appellant
and were found by James Gaskill, director of the crime
laboratory at Weber State College, to be consistent and like!)
to have come from the same person (T. 95).

He testified that

it is difficult to place a specific degree of probabilityon
the comparison of hair samples, but that studies of others
indicate the likelihood of two hair samples from two different
people matching is in excess of ninety-five percent and that
the studies range up as high as one in forty-five hundred (T.
96).

The defense did not object to Mr. Gaskill's

testifyi~

to the degree of probability, but did object to his

referri~

to the studies of others for lack of foundation (T. 96,
99-100).
Appellant's sister-in-law, Tony Clayton, testified
that appellant came to her home late in the evening of
November 14th or early in the morning of the 15th of November,
1979, wearing Levis and what she thought was a red shirt
79, 82).

He wanted to speak to his brother (T. 79).

(T.

She

testified appellant left some credit cards at her horn~ whkh
bore the decedent, John Linde's, name (T. 79).

She destroyed

them because she knew they did not belong to the appellant and
she did not want them in her house (T. 79).

-4-
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ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE JURY WAS PROPERLY INSTRUCTED ON
CIRCUMSTANTIAL EVIDENCE.
Appellant's conviction was based solely upon
circumstantial evidence.

The narrow question presented by

this appeal is whether the trial court properly instructed the
jury on how it should consider and weigh evidence in a case
which is totally circumstantial.
The jury was specifically instructed on
circumstantial evidence as follows:

L

Circumstantial evidence is
competent, and is to be regarded by the
jury in all cases.
It should have its
just and fair weight with you; you are
not to fancy situations or circumstances
which do not appear in the evidence but
you are to make those just and reasonable
inferences from the circumstances proven
which the guarded judgment of a
reasonable man would ordinarily make
under like circumstances; and if in
connection with the other evidence before
you, you then have no reasonable doubt as
to the defendant's guilt, you should
convict him but if you then entertain
such doubt, you should acquit him.
To
warrant a conviction on circumstantial
evidence, each fact necessary to
establish the guilt of the accused must
be proven by competent evidence beyond a
reasonable doubt and the facts and
circumstances proven should not only be
consistent with the guilt of the accused
but must be inconsistent with any other
reasonable hypothesis or conclusion than
that of guilt.

-5-

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

Jury Instruction No. 9 ( R. 118) .1

The defense objected to

this instruction at trial on the sole ground that it did not
advise the jury to regard circumstantial evidence with
"caution":
MR. STANGER: We will take exception to
Instruction No. 9.
That is the only one
we have, Your Honor.
THE COURT: You don't wish to.make a
specification in No. 9 what you claim is
error?
MR. STANGER: The thing we have set
forth, Your Honor, it's our position that
the Utah cases hold that circumstantial
evidence is not of the same quality as
direct evidence, and the jury should so
be instructed. And that is left out of
Instruction No. 9. As I recall the case
it said it should be regarded with
caution; that I cited for the Court.
THE COURT:
It [Instruction No. 9) says
"guarded judgment of a reasonable man
would ordinarily make under like
circumstances." Then I have the
reasonable hypothesis.
That is your only exception?
MR. STANGER: Yes, sir.
(T. 119-20)
No objection was made to the adequacy of any other aspect of
Instruction No. 9.

lThe jury was also given standard instructions on evidence
including the fact that the State had "the burden of proving
beyond a reasonable doubt the essential elements of the
crime," Instructions Nos. 4, 5, and 10 (R. 113, 114, and 1191;
the definition of reasonable doubt, Instruction No. 11 (R.
119); that they should consider the evidence as a whole,
Instruction No. 12 (R. 120); and that the jury was to
determine the weight and credibility of the evidence,
Instruction No. 13 (R. 120).
-6Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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On appeal, appellant raises an additional objection
to the instructions given, beyond the single objection he
preserved at trial.

He now asserts that the jury was not

adequately instructed that in a totally circumstantial
~idence

case such evidence must preclude ev~ry other

reasonable hypothesis of defendant's innocence.

He concedes

that this subject was addressed in Instruction No. 9, but
c~ims

it should have been covered in a separate specific

instruction because of its importance.

Finally, appellant

claims that his proposed jury instructions were clearer and
more accurate on the above two points than the instruction
given by the Court, and therefore it was error to reject his
proffered instructions. 2
At the outset, appellant should be barred from
raising any claims for the first time on appeal which were not
properly preserved at trial.

It is well recognized in Utah

that:

2Note that the record contains two separate sets of
instructions proposed by the defense and that appellant only
~furs in his brief to the first set found at R. 91-101 dated
June 30, 1980. He also submitted a second set of proposed
instructions on November 24, 1980 found at R. 102-110.
~spite the fact that these two sets were duplicative in
sub~tance though worded somewhat differently, the trial court
;ev1ewed both sets and either rejected them or noted that the
instructions had been given in substance.
-7-

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

When a party fails to make a proper
objection to an erroneous instruction; or
to present to the court a proper request
to supply any claimed deficiency in the
instructions, he is thereafter precluded
from contending error.
State v. Kazda, Utah, 545 P.2d 190, 193 (1976); State v.
Kitchen, Utah, 564 P.2d 760 (1977); State v. Gandee, Utah,
P.2d 1064 (1978).

5~

This rule has been modified by the plain

error rule which is recognized in many states and in the
federal courts.

The modification allows this Court to review

an issue for the first time on appeal if there appears to bea
substantial likelihood that an injustice has resulted.
v. Schoenfeld, Utah, 545 P.2d 193 (1976).

State

However, as will be

shown, no such injustice is present in the instant case.
Thus, appellant's argument that the jury should have been
separately instructed on the alternate reasonable hypothesis
should be summarily rejected.

Should this Court choose to

reach this issue, it is clear the jury was adequately
instructed on this point.

Again, Instruction No. 9 ( R. 1181

provided in pertinent part that:
• • • To warrant a conviction on
circumstantial evidence, each fact
necessary to establish the guilt of the
accused must be proven by competent
evidence beyond a reasonable doubt and
the facts and circumstances proven should
not only be consistent with the guilt of
the accused but must be inconsistent with

-8-
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any other reasonable hypothesis
conclusion than that of guilt.
(CT

118).

To

or

give a separate instruction on the reasonable

alternative hypothesis would have been superfluous and
confusing•
In any criminal case,
[t]he prosecutor's burden, • • • whether
the evidence be direct or circumstantial
or a combination thereof, is to prove all
elements of the crime charged beyond a
reasonable doubt, whether the defense is
a denial or an affirmative defense.
State v. Starks, Utah, 627 P.2d 88, 92 (1981).
The test whether rejection of a reasonable
alternative hypothesis instruction is error is set forth in
State v. King, Utah, 604 P.2d 923 (1979), a case in which the
appellant argued that the trial court had committed error in
refusing to give such an instruction.

This Court said:

Of course, the requested instructions may
make more understandable and explicit the
usual instruction on burden of proof. We
cannot say, however, that the
instructions given in this case
inadequately informed the jury as to how
convincing the proof had to be to
convict •
.!9_. at 926.

This Court also cited State v. Schad, 24 Utah 2d

255, 470 P.2d 247 (1970), to the effect that it is a matter

-9-
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for nthe jury to determine from all the facts and
circumstances" the guilt or innocence of the accused.
247.

Id. at

If the jury is:
convinced beyond a reasonable doubt of
the defendant's guilt, it necessarily
follows that they regarded the evidence
as excluding every other reasonable
hypothesis.

Id.

Therefore, if the instruction "adequately inform(s) ..

the jury as to how convincing the proof • • •

[(has)] •

.

~

be to convict" (Starks, supra, at 92), the jury in such a case
has been adequately instructed and no reasonable alternative
hypothesis instruction is necessary.
Utah, 611 P.2d 1211 (1981).

Accord:

State v. Eagle,

"Generally, other forms of

instructions can effectively accomplish the same purpose of
conveying to the jury the meaning of 'proof beyond a
reasonable doubt'" (Starks, supra, at 92).
On the first day of trial the prosecutor advised
the jury in his opening statement that the evidence in this
case would be wholly circumstantial and introduced to the jury
the notion of "every other reasonable hypothesis except
guilt."
Now evidence generally speaking,
just by way of explanation, falls into
two classes.
There is direct evidence,
which can be explained as similar to an
eyewitness, someone having seen something
-10-
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occur, something that points directly
toward the facts being attempted to be
proved.
Then there is indirect or more
commonly known as circumstantial
evidence.
These are circumstances.
This
case will be presented to you entirel'f"b'Y
way of circumstantial evidence.
Now as I believe the Court's'
instructions will tell eventually in
evaluating circumstantial evidence, it
must exclude every other reasonable
hypothesis, except guilt.
If the
circumstantial evidence is also
consistent with innocence, then you must
find innocence or not guilty.
(R.

12) {Emphasis added).
As noted above, the reasonable alternative

hypothesis theory was included in the jury instruction in this
case.

Had appellant's requested jury instructions been given,

the result would have been superfluous, repetitive, and
ambiguous with the risk of confusing the jury.
Finally, Respondent could not locate, nor did
~~llant

cite, any authority for the proposition that the

reasonable hypothesis theory must be presented in a separate
jury instruction as opposed to being part of a general

iMtruction on circumstantial evidence.
Appellant's second major contention is that the
trial court erred in refusing to instruct that circumstantial
evidence should be viewed with caution.

At trial, appellant

seemed to contend that the word "caution" is a legal term of
art when used in a jury instruction intended to indicate to
-11Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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the jury how it is to view circumstantial evidence, and that
the court's use of the term "guarded judgment" in this case
was inadequate.
Appellant bases his notion that the word "caution•
is required on the following language found in Schad, supra:
As to point (1): whether the
evidence justifies the verdict., we survey
the evidence and any reasonable
inferences that fairly may be drawn
therefrom in the light favorable to the
jury's verdict.
However, there are some
further observations as to the manner in
which that basic rule is applicable in
this case.
It is true, as the defendant
contends, that where a conviction is
based on circumstantial evidence, the
evidence should be looked upon with
caution, and that it must exclude every
reasonable hypothesis except the guilt of
defendant.
This is entirely logical,
because if the jury believes that there
is a reasonable hypothesis in the
evidence consistent with the defendant's
innocence, there would naturally be a
reasonable doubt as to his guilt,
Nevertheless, that proposition does not
apply to each circumstance separately,
but is a matter within the prerogative of
the jury to determine from all of the
facts and circumstances shown; and if
therefrom they are convinced beyond a
reasonable doubt of the defendant's
guilt, it necessarily follows that they
regarded the evidence as excluding every
other reasonable hypothesis.
Unless upon
our review of the evidence, and the
reasonable inferences fairly to be
deduced therefrom, it appears that there
is no reasonable basis therein for such a
conclusion, we should not overturn the
verdict.
Id. at 247.

-12-
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Schad, when read in context, does not stand for the
proposition that the word "caution" is legally necessary in an
instruction on circumstantial evidence.

The issue this Court

was addressing involved a general discussion of the test this
court would apply in determining the sufficiency of the
evidence to justify a jury verdict.

While it is true that

caution in viewing the evidence in a wholly circumstantial
case is mentioned, it is nowhere asserted to be a required
element of a jury instruction.
jury instructions.

Schad does not even discuss

Rather, the emphasis is on the rule that

for evidence to be sufficient to convict in a wholly
circumstantial case "it must exclude every reasonable
hypothesis except the guilt of defendant" (Id.).
That caution is not an essential element either of
this test or an instruction purporting to convey the standard
on burden of proof to a jury is further suggested by the fact

that neither of the cases on which Schad relies for this point
(People v. Scott, 10 Utah, 217 37 P. 335 (1894), and State v.
~·Utah,

101 365, 120 P.2d 286 (1932)) mentions "caution."

Scott and Erwin address only the reasonable hypothesis portion
of the statement in Schad.

The Schad progeny on this point reveal only one
case which even mentions "caution" and that occurs in a direct
quotation from Schad itself.

King, supra, at 926.

No

-13Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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elucidation is given in King, supra, or in any of the cases
citing Schad as to the inclusion of caution in jury
instructions on circumstantial evidence.

In fact, none of

these cases, except King, even discusses jury instructions.
The cases generally cite Schad for the proposition that where
the evidence is wholly circumstantial every reasonable
hyPothesis of the defendant's innocence must be excluded
(State v. Dodge, Utah, 564 P.2d 312, 313 (1977)), and that
this "is in reality nothing more than another manner of
stating the burden of proof applicable in all criminal cases,
viz., beyond a reasonable doubt."
P.2d 229, 232 (1980).
410, 411 (1978).

Accord:

State v. Lamm, Utah, 606

State v. John, Utah, 586

p,~

ResPondent found no cases that would suggest

that the word "caution" is essential in a jury instruction on
circumstantial evidence.

The only cases which shed any light

on whether a particular jury instruction is required in wholiy
circumstantial evidence cases are King, supra, and State v.
Garcia, 11 Utah 2d 67, 355 P.2d 57 (1960).
The appellant in King contended the trial court hao
erred in failing to give his requested "instruction to the
jury in explaining the effect of reasonable alternatives or
hyPotheses uPon the burden of proof in a er iminal case.•
at 926.

-14-
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Id·

After quoting the appellant's requested jury
instruction and the language from Schad containing the
'caution" dicta, this Court indicated that if it cannot be
said the instructions given in a case "inadequately informed
the jury as to how convincing the proof had to be to commit,"
the fact that "the requested instructions may make more

@derstandable and explicit the usual instruction on burden of
~oof"

does not mean the rejected instructions are to be

proffered or that it is reversible error not to give them.
Id,

State v. Garcia, supra, cited in a somewhat unclear
fashion in appellant's brief, provides further guidance on
this same point.

There this Court said:

It is universally recognized that there
is no jury question without substantial
evidence indicating defendant's guilt
beyond a reasonable doubt.
This requires
evidence from which the jury could
reasonably find defendant guilty of all
material issues of fact usually with
reference to the jury instructions, we
have held that where the only proof of
material fact or one which is a necessary
element of defendant's guilt consists of
circumstantial evidence, such
circumstances must reasonably preclude
every reasonable hypothesis of
defendant's innocence.
An instruction to
this effect in an appropriate situation
would be proper but this requires care to
use language which the Jury would
understand and which would not merely
lend to their confusion.
~. supra, at 59, 69 (Emphasis added).

-15-
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Respondent respectfully submits that nowhere has
this Court indicated that caution is an essential term of art
to a jury instruction on circumstantial evidence.
Moreover, respondent submits there is no essential
distinction between the word "caution" and the term "guarded
judgment" as used by the court in Jury Instruction Number 9.
Webster's New International Dictionary of the English
Language, 2nd Edition, Unabridged, G.

&

c.

Merriam Co., 1934,

defined "caution" as:
[a] precept or warning against evil of
any kind; an exhortation to wariness;
something, as a word, act, or command,
that conveys a warning.
Synonyms, care,
forethought, heed, prudence,
~~
circumspection, counsel, advise, warning,
admonition.
Id. at 428.

Similarly, "guarded" is defined as being:
cautious, wary, circumspect; as, he was
guarded in his expressions; framed or
uttered with caution; as, his expressions
were guarded.
Synonyms, discreet,
watchful, Cf. careful.

Id. at 1111.

"Judgment" is defined as:

[t]he mental act of judging; the
operation of the mind, involving
comparison and discrimination, by which
knowledge of values and relations is
mentally formulated; the power of
arriving at a wise decision or conclusion
on the basis of indications and
probabilities, when the facts are not
clearly ascertained; as, to use your best
judgment; discretion; discernment; as, a
man of sound JUdgment.
Id. at 1343 (Emphasis added).
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Respondent submits that even taking into account
"caution" or "guarded judgment" stated in the Schad opinion
when viewing all the circumstantial evidence and inferences
therefrom, the test to be applied by this Court on review is
the same:
Unless upon our review of the evidence,
and the reasonable inferences fairly to
be deduced therefrom, it appears that
there is no reasonable basis therein for
such a conclusion, we should not overturn
the verdict.
Schad, supra, at 247.
Respondent submits that in the sense in which it
was used in Jury Instruction 9 in this case, the term "guarded
judgment" is the semantic equivalent of "caution" and submits
that the jury was properly instructed on the law related to
circumstantial evidence in the instructions given.

When those

instructions are read as a whole, it is evident that they
contain the correct elements of appellant's proposed jury
instructions which he alleges were improperly refused by the
court in the instant case (Appellant's Brief at 4).

The

instructions given represented an accurate understanding of
the correct principles of law applicable to this case.
A brief examination of defendant's requested Jury
Instruction Number 1 which he now claims for the first time
ws improperly rejected by the trial court indicates why it
was properly refused.

-17-
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Again, appellant should be precluded from raising
this issue for the first time on appeal, but should this Couc'
decide to reach it, it is clear that appellant was not
prejudiced by rejection of his Jury Instruction Number 1,
which stated:
You are instructed that
circumstantial evidence is nec.essarily
less convincing and of less value than
direct evidence.
Circumstantial evidence
must be treated with caution.
(RT 92).
This is an erroneous statement of the law.

While

it is true there is dicta to indicate circumstantial evidence
may be of less quality than direct evidence (Schad, supra;
State v. John, Utah, 586 P.2d 410, 411 (1978)), other
decisions of this Court indicate this is not the case.3
Since direct and circumstantial evidence are
treated the same under the law as regards their probative
value, they should not be treated differently in jury

3state v. Housekeeper, Utah, 588 P.2d 139, 140 (1978)
("Circumstantial evidence may be even more convincing than
direct testimony."); State v. Laub, 102 Utah 402, 131 P.2d
805, 807 (1942) (" . • • such evidence may be just as
conclusive or even more so than direct evidence."); State v.
Kallas, 97 Utah 492, 94 P.2d 414, 425 (1939) ("Circumstantial
evidence alone is enough to support a verdict of guilty of the
most heinous crime • • • ") (See discussion in State v.
Wilkins,· 523 P.2d 728, 733-737 (Kans. 1974) ).
-18-
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1

instructions.

The important and essential element when

dealing with either form of proof is whether it convinces the
iury beyond a reasonable doubt of the guilt of the defendant.
If that is the case, any superfluous language commanding one

type of proof is of less value and should be treated with
caution could only confuse the jury.
POINT II
NO ERROR WAS COMMITTED IN ADMITTING THE
TESTIMONY OR THE EXPERT WITNESS, JAMES
GASKILL.
Appellant next contends that the "probability
testimony regarding hair samples was improperly admitted"
(Appellant• s Brief at 4) and cites error in two areas.
'First, there was a lack of foundation for the probability
evidence and second, such probability evidence had a
disproportionate impact upon the jury's conclusion"
(Appellant's Brief at 5).
Appellant's argument that there was a lack of
foundation for the expert testimony on probabilities may be
s~marily

disposed of.

After Mr. James Gaskill had been

called and sworn as a witness for the state, the prosecutor
b~an asking questions to establish his qualifications so that

he might give expert opinion and testimony (T. 89).

Defense

counsel interjected that he would stipulate to Mr. Gaskill's
-19-
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The court found that stipulation

qualifications (Id.).

I

adequate to establish Mr. Gaskill as an expert (Id.), and that I
he was qualified to base his opinion on the studies of others•
(T. 96).

When defense counsel objected (citing lack of

foundation) to Mr. Gaskill's testimony based on his own
studies and those of others, the court overruled the objec'tior,j
based on defense counsel's prior

stipula~ion

to the witness' I
I

qualifications.
Speaking generally about the qualifications of a
witness to testify as an expert, Wigmore indicates:
The possession of the required
qualifications by a particular person
offered as a witness, must be expressly
shown by the party offering him. This
follows from the nature of the situation
• • • and is universally conceded • • • •
Second and emphatically, the trial court
must be left to determine, absolutely and
without review, the fact of possession of
the required qualification by a
particular witness. In most
jurisdictions it is repeatedly declared
that the decision upon the experiential
qualifications of witnesses should be
left to the determination of the trial
court.
2 Wigmore, Evidence,

§§

560, 561 (Chadbourn rev. 1979)_.

Rule 56 of the Utah Rules of Evidence (1953)
I

indicates the conditions under which a witness may testify asj
an expert and says that "[u]nless the judge excludes the
testimony he shall be deemed to have made the finding
requisite to its admission."
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It would seem that where the requirement to show
qualifications to give expert testimony is obviated by an
express stipulation by opposing counsel, there is no issue as
to those qualifications or need for foundation for the opinion
that may later be expressed.

State v. Mason, Utah, 5 30 P. 2d

795, 798 (1975).

Appellant should have challenged Mr. Gaskill's
qualifications during the trial; his assertion of lack of
foundation for a portion of the expert opinion comes late and
should be rejected by this Court.
As to Mr. Gaskill's referring to the studies of
other knowledgable persons in the field of hair comparison and
analysis, it must be remembered at the outset that Mr. Gaskill
did not cite those studies for the truth of the matter

asserted, i.e., to show that the samples of hair taken from
the appellant were in fact the same as those found on the cap
found at the victim's home.

Thus the studies to which Mr.

Gaskill referred would not come under the definition of
hearsay.
In Jenkins v. United States, 307 F.2d 637 (D.C.
Cir. 1962) the

u.s.

Court of Appeals said:

we agree with the leading commentators
that the better reasoned authorities
admit opinion testimony based, in part,
upon reports of others which are not in
evidence but which the expert customarily
relies upon in the practice of his
profession.

l9_. at 641.

(Citing McCormick, Evidence,

~. Evidence,

§

688 (3d Ed. 1940) .)

§

15 (1955) and

Accord:

l

United
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States v. Morrison, 531 F.2d 1089, 1094 (1st Cir. 1976);
Federal Rules of Evidence, 703.
In State v. Garrison, 585 P.2d 563 (Ariz. 1978),
the Arizona Supreme Court said:
Arizona Rules of Evidence, l 7A A.R.S.,
effective September 1, 1977, provides by
Rule 803(18) that statements contained in
published treatises, periodicals, or
pamphlets on the subject of medicine are
not excluded by the hearsay rule.
Id. at 566.

In Garrison the error asserted on appeal

concerned the prejudicial quality of testimony of mathematical
probabilities given by an expert as to comparisons he had madi
betwen bite marks found on the victim's corpse and impressions
made from castings taken of the defendant's teeth.
Indeed, appellant similarly contends that the
probability testimony of Mr. Gaskill was erroneously admitted
because of its alleged prejudicial impact on the jury.
In examining this claim, it must be observed that
the testimony offered by Mr. Gaskill was for the purpose of
corroborating the eyewitness testimony of David Robertson, who
personally knew appellant and observed him at approximately
7:30 p.m. on November 14, 1979 (T. 102), the day on which the
victim was beaten (T. 19).

He identified a cap found at t~

victim's home (T. 52) as the one he had seen worn by the
defendant on the early evening of November 14 at Bullock's
Billiards (T. 105).
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Additionally, the jury had the testimony of Richard
Findley to the effect that he observed a "bearded man with
long hair" wearing the cap at about B: 00 in the evening also
at Bullock's Billiards ( T. 2 2, 10 2).

Two i terns of clothing

worn by the individual he observed wearing the cap (orange
vest and Levi trousers) matched items of clothing recalled by
witness Robertson (T. 103).
The jury also had before it the testimony of the
appellant's sister-in-law to the effect that during the late
evening hours of the 14th of November or early morning hours

of November 15, 1979, the appellant, dressed in Levis and what
she thought was a red shirt, came to her home to speak with
his brother, the witness' husband (T. 79).

Appellant

apparently left some credit cards that had the name of the
victim, John Linde, embossed on them (T. 79).
Thus, the only purpose for James Gaskill's expert
testimony was to provide corroboration that the cap found at
llie Linde home and seen on appellant's head earlier that
evening had been worn by appellant ( T. 9 5).
The test on appeal in Utah for the admission of
expert opinion testimony is as follows:

The reviewing court:

la) examines the record to determine if there was some basis
for the testimony given at the trial, and (b) determines if
the jury had oppcrtunity to weigh the testimony against any
opposing, mitigating or impeaching testimony or opinion.
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Where it appears to the trial court that a reasonable
foundation for the opinion of the expert has been given, it is
then within the discretion of that court to admit the
challenged evidence and "allow any frailties therein to be
exposed by cross-examination."

State v. Ward, Utah, 347 P.2d

865, 868 (1959).
In considering whether such testimony was
prejudicial error, it is necessary to
weigh not only the opinion itself but the
extent to which any existing weaknesses
therein were so exposed to the jury. The
faults in it, assailed by the defendant,
go to its weight rather than to its
competency.
Id.
This test was met in the instant case.

A

reasonable foundation for the testimony existed because of
defense counsel's stipulation to the witness' qualifications.
This was sufficient to establish him as an expert qualified to
base his opinions on his own studies and those of others (T.
96).
Next, the jury had before it admissions on direct
examination by Mr. Gaskill to the effect that "it [is] very
difficult to put a specific number on" (T. 96) the "likelihood
[that the hair from the defendant and hair found on the cap]
came from the same person" (Id.).

-24-
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On cross-examination, Mr. Gaskill frankly admitted
the difficulty in assigning a numerical value to the
probability that two hairs came from the same individual.
Mditionally, counsel for the appellant brought out several
areas in his cross-examination of Mr. Gaskill that limit and
impeach the reliability of giving probabli ty percentages in
hair similarity cases (T. 96-99).
As stated by this Court in Ward, supra, any faults
in the testimony of an expert witness "go to its weight rather
than to its competency• (Id. at 868).
Here, the testimony of Mr. Gaskill was by way of
corroboration, not primary identification.

The testimony was

subject to cross-examination during which negative aspects of
that testimony were brought to light before the jury, and the
witness freely admitted the difficulty of assigning a
percentage of numerical probability to hair comparison cases.
In State v. Carlson, 267 N.W.2d 170 (Minn. 1978),
cited by appellant for the proposition that statistical
probabilities are prejudicial, the testimony of the expert was
directed specifically at the defendant in that case, and the
probabilities were projections from the specific hairs found
on the victim as compared with samples taken from the
defendant Carlson.

In the instant case, the expert merely

testified that:
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[t]he studies indicate that the
likelihood of two hair samples from two
people, two different people matching, is
way in excess of ninety-five percent.
The studies range up as high as one in
forty-five hundred.
(T. 96).

There was no elaboration or attempt by the

prosecutor to apply any specific percentages or numerical
quantities to the facts and circumstances of this case, and
the witness freely admitted the difficulties in making
statistical comparisons.

In answering the question "[M]ay

expert witnesses express their findings in terms of
mathematical probabilities?", the court in Carlson found that
the testimony conveying "the suggestion of mathematical
precision•

(Id. at 176) was improperly received but was

nonprejudicial because it was cumulative in nature.

The

Carlson court indicated that probability testimony becomes
prejudicial only when "the odds are based on estimates, the
validity of which have not been demonstrated."

Id., citing

State v. Sneed, 414 P. 2d 8 58 (New Mexico, 1966).

In Carlson,

supra, the court found that adequate foundation had been laid
for the expert• s testimony and that the statistics quoted in
the record were based "upon empirical scientific data of
unquestioned validity.•

Id.

The error found by the court in U.S. v. Massey, 591i
F.2d 676, 680 (8th Cir. 1979), also cited by appellant, was

I
i

also lack of foundation for the testimony that was admitted, !
not the inherent invalidity of the studies or results referrecl
to.
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r
Respondent asserts that appellant in the instant
case was not prejudiced by the comment made by the expert
witness concerning studies he had read regarding hair
comparison.

If error was committed, it was not prejudicial.

Respondent respectfully submits that the admission of the
testimony was proper and that if error was committed in so
doing, the error was harmless under the Ward, supra, analysis.
CONCLUSION
Based upon the points and authorities stated above,
the conviction and sentence should be affirmed.
DATED this 20th day of January, 1982.
Respectfully submitted,
DAVID L. WILKINSON
Attorney General
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